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Abstract 
 
This paper presents tests of uncovered interest parity in Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania; all countries in Central and Eastern  Europe with 
floating exchange rates. Data are monthly and the trading horizon is three months. 
The estimations show that the UIP hypothesis is rejected for the full sample from 
1999 to 2011 for all five countries. A number of reasons for the rejection were 
investigated. Rolling regressions show that standard versions of the UIP essentially 
lose  all  explanatory  power  in  2008-10,  which  was a  period  in which  the  global 
financial  crisis  led  to  instability  in  currency  and  interest  markets  in  Central  and 
Eastern Europe. Two indicators of global risk aversion were also found to enter 
significantly  in  the  many  UIP  estimations.  Finally,  the  size  of  the  interest  rates 
spread also seems to be of importance, at least for Poland and Romania.  
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“Uncovered interest rate parity remains a 
key assumption in international economics 
despite  the  massive  body  of  empirical 
evidence against the hypothesis.”  
A. Alexius (2001, p. 505) 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This paper presents the results of econometric analyses testing the uncovered interest 
parity  (UIP)  hypothesis  on  data  from  Poland,  the  Czech  Republic,  Hungary, 
Romania and Croatia. The data sample starts in 1999 or shortly afterwards and ends 
in September 2011, and as such spans a period in which the countries experienced 
both rapid economic and financial integration and also the fallout from the global 
financial crisis. The UIP hypothesis is tested for a trading horizon of three months 
using  monthly  data.  The  five  countries  in  the  sample  are  the  main  countries  in 
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Central  and  Eastern Europe having  floating  or  essentially  floating  exchange  rate 
regimes during the sample period.
3 Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary joined 
the European Union in May 2004 and Romania in January 2007, while Croatia was 
in the final stages of membership negotiations at the time of writing in August 2011.  
 
The hypothesis of uncovered interest parity rests on the idea that arbitrage leads to 
equalisation of the return on assets or liabilities in the domestic currency and the 
expected return on comparable assets or liabilities in a foreign currency. Testing the 
UIP hypothesis may thus provide information as to whether the exchange a nd 
interest markets under consideration function so that all the gains from trade are 
exploited, i.e. whether the markets are efficient. In practice, however, divergence 
between domestic and expected foreign returns may also be due to issues such as 
transaction costs, different risk profiles and non-symmetric tax treatments.  
 
This paper presents tests of the UIP hypothesis for  Croatia, the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania. Section 2 provides a survey of empirical studies of 
the UIP hypothesis wi th a particular focus on studies dealing with countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). There are only a very limited number of studies 
that  examine  the  UIP  hypothesis  for  Central  and  East  European  countries, 
particularly  studies  which  use  data  coveri ng  the  EU  accession  and the  global 
financial crisis. The CEE countries liberalised their capital markets and removed 
their  remaining  exchange  rate  restrictions  before  joining  the  EU  (European 
Commission 2010a). Many of the countries experienced substantial  capital inflows 
in the years immediately before and after accession to the EU, just to see a reversal 
of the flows in 2008-09 following the global financial crisis (Jevcak et al. 2011). It is 
a largely un-researched question whether these abrupt changes in capital flows have 
affected the relationship between exchange rates and interest rates in the CEE 
countries. 
 
Testing  the  UIP  hypothesis  for  the  CEE  countries  is  also  important  because 
households and firms in many countries in the region have borrowed ex tensively in 
foreign currencies, mostly the euro and the Swiss franc (Rosenberg & Tirpak 2008). 
In essence borrowers expect that borrowing in a foreign currency is cheaper than 
domestic currency borrowing, meaning they have bet that the UIP will not hold 
within the horizon of the loan contract. Speculators without an underlying motive of 
borrowing or saving have also taken positions,  carry trade, in the currencies of the 
CEE countries. Rosenberg & Tirpak (2008) and Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2010) find 
that  the  interest  differential  between  domestic  and  foreign  rates  is  an  important 
determinant of borrowing and saving in foreign currencies in the CEE countries.
4  
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This paper seeks to contribute to the empirical literature on the UIP by investigating 
its empirical validity in the main CEE countries that have a floating exchange rate. 
The paper tests the UIP hypothesis using individual regressions for each of the five 
CEE countries. As typically found in the literature, the UIP holds better for some 
countries  than  for  others  and  better  in  some  periods  than  in  others.  The  paper 
investigates factors that may explain the variation across countries and across time, 
linking the findings to the different stages of convergence attained in the countries 
and to the global financial crisis that unfolded in 2007-2009.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 discusses the theoretical 
foundation of the UIP hypothesis. Section 3 surveys a number of empirical studies 
with a particular emphasis on the CEE countries. Section 4 documents the data and 
shows the results of unit root tests. Section 5 presents the baseline estimations using 
the full sample available. Section 6 contains the estimations when structural change 
is identified using rolling windows. Section 7 considers whether there are non-linear 
effects. Section 8 shows the results when different proxies of external determinants 
of the risk premium are included. Finally, Section 9 summarises the results.  
 
2. The theory of uncovered interest parity 
 
The theory underlying the Uncovered Interest Parity is fairly simple as it builds on 
the assumption of arbitrage equalising expected returns in different markets (Levi 
2005, Ch. 8).  
 
Consider the investment decision of an investor who at time t seeks to invest a sum 
for a period of m time units. Assuming that the interest rate is constant and equal to 
m t i ,  for the entire investment horizon, the gross return from investing domestically 
is  m t i , 1  per time unit leading to 
m
m t i ) 1 ( ,   compounded during the m periods of 
the investment. The sum can alternatively be exchanged at the spot exchange rate 
t S   and  invested  abroad  at  the  interest  rate 
*
,m t i .  The  foreign  denominated  gross 
return after m periods is  t
m
m t S i / ) 1 (
*
,   and this sum can be exchanged into domestic 
currency at the exchange rate  m t S  . 
 
In practice the exchange rate m periods ahead is unknown, so the investor will have 
to  form  expectations  for  this  exchange  rate.  The  variable 
e
m t S    denotes  the 
expectation in period  t   for  the  exchange  rate  in  period  m t  .  A  risk-neutral 
investor  would  be  indifferent  as  to  whether  to  invest  in  the  domestically 
denominated asset or in the foreign denominated asset if the expected returns are 
identical, i.e. if uncovered interest parity holds:  
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This  condition  is  usually  log-linearised.  We  adopt  the  notation 
e
m t m S   log   = 
t
e
m t S S log log   , which is approximately the relative change in the exchange rate 
over the m-period horizon of the investment. The variable 
e
m t m S   log  is positive if 
the  investor  expects  that  the  domestic  currency  will  depreciate  from period  t  to 
period t + m and negative if the investor expects that the domestic currency will 
appreciate. Using this notation eq. (1) becomes:  
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Using the approximations  ) 1 log( , , m t m t i i    and  ) 1 (
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,
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, m t m t i i    and lowercase st to 
denote the logarithm of the exchange rate, i.e. ) log( t t S s   and  ) log(
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the version of the UIP in eq. (2) can be rewritten as:  
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The left-hand side is the annualised average expected capital gain from the foreign 
currency investment. The right hand side is the spread between the domestic and 
foreign interest rates. The upshot is that a positive spread is consistent with the UIP 
hypothesis only if the spot rate is expected to depreciate in the way given in eq. (3), 
i.e. investment in the foreign denominated asset will only take place if the positive 
interest spread is compensated for by a corresponding capital gain.
5  
 
Eq. (3) can be tested empirically if a measure of the  expected spot exchange rate m 
periods  ahead  is  available,  for  instance  from  surveys  or  market  data.  A  more 
common  methodology,  however,  is  based  on  the  assumption  of  rational 
expectations,  i.e.  m s
e
m t m /     =  m t m t m m s      / ,  where  0 ] [ E   m t t ,  i.e.  the 
mathematical expectation of  m t   is zero, conditional on information in period t. 
This empirical version of the UIP is:  
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A simple empirical methodology for a test of the UIP hypothesis entails estimation 
of the following standard UIP regression model:  
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Eq. (5) is the model used in most estimations in the paper. The UIP corresponds to 
the joint null hypothesis that the constant ʱ = 0, the slope coefficient β = 1 and 
0 ] [ E   m t t ; the UIP hypothesis cannot be rejected if none of these conditions can 
be rejected.
6 Three comments are appropriate: 
 
First,  the  assumption  that  0 ] [ E   m t t   implies  that  the  residuals  are  serially 
uncorrelated if the investment horizon coincides with the sampling frequency. If, 
however, the investment horizon exceeds the investment frequency (as would be the 
case  with,  for  instance,  monthly  data  and  a  quarterly  investment  horizon), 
overlapping data emerge and the residual will be subject to serial correlation of order 
m  –  1  even  if  0 ] [ E   m t t   is  satisfied  for  the  investment  horizon  (Baillie  & 
Bollerslev 2000).
  
 
Second, the test implies essentially a joint test of several hypotheses, including the 
hypothesis that arbitrage equalises the expected currency gain and the interest rate 
differential and the hypothesis that investors have rational expectations (Alper et al. 
2009). If ʱ = 0 and β = 1 cannot be rejected (in a model with non-serially correlated 
residuals), it is reasonable to assume that both hypotheses are satisfied. Rejection 
implies that the UIP does not hold, but the underlying reason (such as absence of 
arbitrage trades or non-rational expectations) cannot be identified right away.  
 
Third,  the  test  entails  the  estimation  of  one  coefficient  of  the  interest  spread 
*
, , m t m t i i  ,  not  separate  coefficients  for  each  of  the  interest  rates.  The  implicit 
assumption is that the investors react only to the interest rate spread, i.e. in similarly 
sized but opposing ways to each of the two interest rates (Mehl & Cappiello 2007). 
In  practice,  the  assumption  is  convenient  as  it  typically  implies  that  the  interest 
spread 
*
, , m t m t i i  is  stationary,  but  this  may  not  be  the  case  for  each  interest  rate 
considered individually.  
 
The theoretical model in eq. (3) and the empirical model in eq. (5) are based on the 
assumption that the investors are risk-neutral and do not require a risk premium to 
hold one currency or the other. This assumption is unrealistic in practice insofar as 
investors are risk averse. A constant risk premium can be included by allowing the 
                                                                  
6 Fama (1984) suggests a narrower test of the UIP hypothesis, essentially testing whether the 
forward rate is an unbiased estimator of the future exchange rate. The Fama regression entails 
that  the  forward  premium  is  regressed  on  the  future  exchange  rate  change  and  a  slope 
coefficient of one is interpreted as confirmation of the efficient market hypothesis.   63 
constant ʱ to differ from zero.
7 This assumption might be too restrictive if the risk 
premium is non-constant, but it would then be necessary to model the risk premium. 
The presence of a risk premium – and in particular a non-constant risk-premium – 
does  not  contradict  the  UIP  hypothesis  per  se,  but  it  complicates  the  empirical 
testing as it requires that the risk premium can be identified empirically.  
 
Beyond the presence of a risk  premium, it is possible to point out a number of 
factors which would entail that eq. (3) would not hold (Levi 2005, Ch. 8): 
  Financial  markets  may  not  be  fully  integrated  because  of  regulation, 
institutional barriers or undeveloped trading possibilities (lack of instruments). 
In this case, the trades needed to arbitrage different expected returns may not be 
available.  
  Illiquidity or thin markets may lead to market inefficiency as prices may not 
reflect  available  information.  Illiquidity  creates  more  risks  and  complicates 
arbitrage trades, but this may not play a major role in currency markets with 
large turnovers.  
  Transaction costs may make it unprofitable to execute trades that exploit small 
deviations from the UIP.  
  Information  costs  may  be  high,  in  part  because  information  is  needed  for 
expectations about exchange rate movements to be formed.  
  Investors  in  exchange  and  interest  markets  may  not  have  fully  rational 
expectations.  Investors  may  use  mechanical  or  momentum-based  trading 
strategies, essentially disregarding the available information.  
  Liquidity  preference  may  favour  investment  in  domestic  currency  assets,  as 
investment in foreign currency assets may be more difficult to wind down if 
there is a sudden need for liquidity in the domestic currency. 
  The asymmetric tax treatment of interest returns and returns from capital gains 
(here  stemming  from  exchange  rate  changes)  may  mean  that  the  strict  UIP 
hypothesis which does not take account of taxation would not hold. 
 
3. Empirical studies 
 
The uncovered interest parity hypothesis has been tested empirically for a long time, 
but better financial data have continuously expanded the possibilities for testing. We 
will  briefly  discuss  the  results  of  studies  using  datasets  covering  developed 
economies,  emerging  market  economies  and  countries  in  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe.  
 
Meese & Rogoff (1983) is an influential early study showing that the interest rate 
spread has essentially no predictive power for the future exchange rate movements 
of the US dollar when evaluated on data from the 1970s.  
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interest rate  m t i ,  must exceed the foreign currency interest 
*
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A range of empirical studies have subsequently examined the UIP hypothesis using 
different currency and time samples and different econometric methods. Froot & 
Thaler (1990) survey 75 published estimates and conclude that the strict version of 
the UIP hypothesis is rejected in almost all cases. Similar conclusions have been 
reached in other subsequent survey papers (e.g. Engel 1996, Alexius 2001). The 
consistent finding that the estimated slope coefficient is far below one and often 
negative has been labelled the forward premium anomaly (Froot & Thaler 1990, 
Booth & Longworth 1986, Olmo & Pilbeam 2011). 
 
Most studies are based on data with investment horizons of one month, three months 
or six months as such data are readily available. Studies suggest, however, that the 
UIP may hold better at longer investment horizons. Chinn & Meredith (2004) study 
the empirical validity of the UIP hypothesis for the currencies of the G7 countries 
using  a  sample  from  1983  to  2000.  For  short  investment  horizons,  the  UIP  is 
rejected in all cases, but when the UIP regression is estimated using 5 or 10 year 
horizons, the slope coefficient is always positive and in many cases not statistically 
different from one.
8 Qualitatively similar results are obtained by Alexius (2001) and 
Mehl & Cappiello (2007)  although the UIP hypothesis is still rejected for some 
countries.  
 
The time sample also seems to be of importance, which is unsurprising given that 
financial markets and regulatory schemes change over time. Lothiana & Wu (2011) 
use a sample of 200 years and consider the UIP hypothesis between the dollar and 
sterling and between the franc and sterling. They find that the slope es timate β 
typically is positive although far from one until 1980, but then turns negative for 
most periods after that. It is argued that the limited support for the UIP hypothesis is 
the result of expectations that ex-post are wrong for extended periods of time. Flood 
& Rose (2002) reach different conclusions using data from the 1990s and a broad 
sample  of  high-income  and  emerging  economies.  Estimation  of  standard  UIP 
regressions leads to the conclusion that the hypothesis received more support from 
their data from the 1990s than from earlier data, although the overall conclusion is 
still negative as spelled out in the title: “Uncovered interest parity in crisis”. 
 
Baillie & Bollerslev (2000) suggest that the forward premium anomaly can, at least 
partly, be explained by the different time series properties of the variables in the 
standard UIP regression. The relative exchange rate change ( m s m t m /   ) is close to 
a random walk (at least at relatively high frequencies), while the interest rate spread 
(
*
, , m t m t i i  ) typically exhibits substantial persistence (but not a unit root). Baillie & 
Bollerslev  (2000)  simulate  data  based  on  these  characteristics  and  show  that  the 
resulting  slope,  although  centred  around one,  exhibits a  very  high  variance.  The 
upshot  is  that  estimations  with  relatively  few  observations  are  likely  to  produce 
                                                                  
8 The finding that the UIP hypothesis generally holds better for long investment horizons than 
for short horizons can be related to the peso problem (Froot & Thaler 1990). In this context, the 
peso problem implies that adjustments of the exchange rate to the UIP may occur in discrete 
and infrequent steps of substantial magnitude.   65 
coefficient  estimates  that  are  sensitive  to  sample  changes  and  that  may  differ 
significantly from one even if the UIP is in fact satisfied.  
 
It is typically found that the UIP holds better for cases where the interest rate spread 
is substantial and less well for cases where the interest rate spread is small. Mehl & 
Cappiello  (2007)  find  that  UIP  relations  estimated  for  some  high-income  and 
emerging  market  economies  exhibit  non-linearities.  They  estimate  a  smooth 
transition regression implying different marginal effects of the interest rate spread 
when the interest rate spread is small and when it is large. The upshot is that the 
standard linear model mixes the effects of different regimes. Using data for selected 
European  currencies,  Lothiana  &  Wu  (2011)  find  more  support  for  the  UIP 
hypothesis in periods in which the interest rate spread is large. This result seems 
intuitively reasonable as factors such as risks and transaction costs may not warrant 
arbitrage trading if the returns from such trades are limited (Froot & Thaler 1990).  
 
Alper  et  al.  (2009)  survey  the  literature  on  UIP  testing  in  emerging  market 
economies. On the one hand, the high trend inflation observed in many emerging 
markets  facilitates  the  forecasting  of  exchange  rate  developments  and  therefore 
makes it more likely that the UIP hypothesis does hold. On the other hand, structural 
breaks and uncertainties are likely to be  more pronounced in emerging  markets, 
which would suggest that the UIP does not hold. Empirical studies confirm that UIP 
estimations  frequently  exhibit  different  properties  for  emerging  markets  and  for 
high-income economies. Alper et al. (2009, p. 123) conclude that “…identifying and 
modelling structural breaks provide room for improvement for further research on 
the UIP condition for [emerging markets]”. Bansal & Dahlquist (2000) provide an 
explicit comparison of results for high-income and emerging market economies and 
conclude that the UIP is more likely to hold for emerging markets than for high-
income  economies.  Different  per  capita  GNP,  average  inflation  and  inflation 
volatility are factors that may explain the different results. 
 
Only a small number of studies have examined the empirical validity of the UIP 
hypothesis  for  countries  in  Central  and  Eastern  Europe.  Brasili  &  Sitzia  (2003) 
estimate panel models based on CEE data in which future exchange rate changes are 
explained  by  the  interest  rate  spread  and  a  range  of  other  factors  that  may  be 
considered proxies of the risk premium. The spread is not statistically significant in 
a specification in which it enters linearly, but a non-linear transformation of the 
spread  attains  statistical  significance,  suggesting  that  non-linearities  play  an 
important role. Ho & Ariff (2009) also use a panel explaining the future exchange 
rate change  with  many  variables along  with the interest rate spread. A range of 
specifications  all  produce  positive  and  statistically  significant  coefficients  to  the 
interest rate spread for the sample of Eastern European countries, but the coefficients 
vary substantially across different specifications. The use of panel data in these two 
studies precludes the estimation of country-specific coefficients of the interest rate 
spread.  
 
Mansori (2003) compares results for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland from 
1994 to 2002 with results for a number of West European countries. There is more   66 
support for the UIP hypothesis for the three East European countries, especially the 
Czech Republic and Hungary, than for the West European countries. The results for 
the  CEE  countries  are  however  very  sensitive  to  changes  in  the  time  sample, 
possibly  as  a  result  of  the  convergence  processes  underway  during  the  period 
analysed. Horobet et al. (2009, 2010) estimate standard UIP regressions for eight 
countries, including four from Central and Eastern Europe using monthly data from 
2006 to 2009. The estimated slope coefficients are positive in all cases, but neither 
economically nor statistically different from zero. This result seems to hold whether 
or not exchange market volatility is taken into account.  
 
4. Data and unit root tests  
 
This section provides an overview of the dataset and the main features of the series 
for the five sample countries, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and 
Romania. The samples vary across the five countries but generally span a bit more 
than a decade, starting in 1999 and ending in September 2011. The five countries all 
had  floating  exchange  rates  during  this  period,  although  Poland  formally  used 
managed devaluations until April 2000 and Hungary used different corridors until 
2008.
9  
 
The analyses are undertaken for positions with a 3-month horizon, implying that the 
returns  from  the  currency  ex posure  and  the  interest  rate  differential  are  both 
calculated for a 3-month holding period. As discussed in the literature survey in 
Section 3, the results may vary with the investment horizon, but the 3-month horizon 
has been chosen because the 3 -month money market is one of the most liquid 
segments of the market. 
 
The five countries saw increased integration with Western Europe, and in particular 
with the euro area, during the sample period. The reference area is therefore taken to 
be the euro area: the exchange rates are in units of local currency per euro and the 
interest rate spreads of the local interest rate are against the Euribor rate. It is 
noticeable  that  the  countries  considered  here  were  at  different  stages  of  their 
processes of convergence with Western Europe during the sample period.
10 
 
                                                                  
9 The Hungarian bands changed frequently before they were finally removed in February 2008. 
Until May 2001, the managed devaluation was based on a “daily rate of devaluation” against, 
in 1999, a basket (30 percent USD, 70 percent EUR) and, thereafter, the euro. The band around 
the central rate of the devaluation path was +/– 2.25 percent. From May to October 2001 the 
band around the central rate was increased to +/– 15 percent. From October 2001 the central 
parity was fixed at 276.1 HUF/EUR and in June 2003 to 282.36 HUF/EUR, while the band 
remained at +/– 15 percent. 
10  For an overview of the stages of convergence, see the European Commi ssion (2010a, 
2010b). Different indicators can be used to a ssess the degree of convergence of the CEE 
countries  with  Western  Europe.  European  Commi ssion  (2010a,  2010b)  asserts  that  the 
convergence process in Romania and Croatia has been slower than that in the other three CEE 
countries in our sample.   67 
Most of the estimations are based on only two variables, cf. eq. (5).
11 The variable 
FX_CHG is the percentage change of the spot exchange rate over a 3-month period, 
where the exchange rate denotes units of local  currency per euro at the end of 
month. A positive value of FX_CHG indicates a depreciation of the local currency 
against the euro over the 3-month period; a negative value indicates an appreciation. 
The variable INT_SP is the annualised interest spread bet ween a 3-month domestic 
currency deposit and the 3-month Euribor.  
 
The available sample of data varies across the countries. For Croatia, the series on 
the nominal exchange rate starts in November 1999, implying that the 3 -month 
FX_CHG variable starts in  February 2000. For Poland, the local 3 -month interest 
rate is available from the beginning of 2001.  Table 1 reports summary statistics of 
the exchange rate changes and the interest rate spreads for the five sample countries. 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for 3-month exchange rate change and 3-month 
interest rate spread 
FX_CHG  Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev.  Obs. 
Croatia  -0.20  -0.51  17.09  -20.97  6.46  140 
Czech Republic  -2.94  -4.24  60.48  -23.00  12.15  153 
Hungary  1.99  2.04  63.03  -47.54  18.54  153 
Poland  2.39  -0.97  98.36  -37.77  25.06  129 
Romania  9.26  6.90  76.87  -32.82  21.12  153 
             
INT_SP  Mean  Median  Max.  Min.  Std. Dev.  Obs. 
Croatia  3.30  2.74  11.05  -0.05  2.50  140 
Czech Republic  0.36  0.15  5.04  -1.35  1.25  153 
Hungary  6.19  5.71  12.97  2.66  2.52  153 
Poland  3.70  3.27  13.03  0.66  2.62  129 
Romania  22.75  13.00  145.07  2.38  26.58  153 
 
Figure  1  depicts  the  nominal  exchange  rate  of  each  Eastern  European   country 
against the euro from the beginning of 1999 and until December 2011. The first 
thing to notice is that the exchange rate dynamics vary considerably across the five 
sample countries. The currencies of Croatia and the Czech Republic have tended to 
appreciate against the euro, while the currency of Romania has tended to depreciate. 
The currencies of Hungary and Poland have been relatively stable with exchange 
rates fluctuating around a relatively constant level. 
 
                                                                  
11 The variables are calculated based on Ecowin source data.   68 
Croatia
7.0
7.2
7.4
7.6
7.8
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
Czech Republic
20
25
30
35
40
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11
Hungary
220
240
260
280
300
320
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11  
Poland
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
5.0
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11  
Romania
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11  
Figure 1. Nominal exchange rate of local currency against euro. 
 
The different exchange rate development across the sample countries is the result of 
many  factors.  The  process  of  integration  into  EU  structures,  and  the  associated 
confidence  effects,  has  affected  the  exchange  rate  dynamics  in  the  Central  and 
Eastern  European  countries.  The  speed  of  and  commitment  to  integration  has 
differed across the countries.
12 The main message for our analyses is that there is no 
“Central and Eastern European block” with closely co-moving exchange rates; the 
exchange  rate  developments  are  fundamentally  different  across  the  five  sample 
countries.  
 
Figure 2 depicts the 3-month annualised change of the exchange rate against the 
euro.  The  series  are  very  volatile,  which  suggests that,  for  the UIP to hold, the 
interest rate differential between the country and the euro area would also have to be 
volatile. 
                                                                  
12 The Romanian case is noticeable because the period from 2003 to 2005 represents a political 
and economic regime switch. During this period Romania joined the Council of Europe and the 
WTO, and became an associated member of the European Union. These steps were part of the 
process of stabilising the political and economic situation in the country, and helped to increase 
the confidence of financial markets in the Romanian economy (European Commission 2010a).   69 
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Figure 2. Annualised changes of local currency versus euro over 3-month period, %. 
 
Figure 3 reports the spread between the local 3-month interbank interest rate and the 
3-month Euribor. The volatility of the interest rates spread is much smaller than the 
volatility of the foreign exchange rate changes on the same horizon.    70 
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Figure 3. Annualised interest rate spreads on 3-month deposits, %. 
 
The time series properties of the exchange rate changes and the interest rate spreads 
have been examined by means of Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests. Given that the 
variables  are  either  changes  in  percentage  terms  (for  currency  pairs)  or  spreads 
(interest rates), the test is performed at the level of the variables and an intercept, but 
no time trend, is included in the estimations. The number of lags used is chosen by 
means of the Schwartz selection criterion. The results are reported in Table 2. The 
hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected in all cases; the series are I(0) for all five 
sample countries.  
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Table 2. Augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root tests 
FX_CHG  1% C.V.  5% C.V.  10% C.V.  Statistic  Prob.  Process 
Croatia  -3.479  -2.883  -2.578  -7.831  0.000  I(0) 
Czech Republic  -3.475  -2.881  -2.577  -5.225  0.000  I(0) 
Hungary  -3.475  -2.881  -2.577  -6.969  0.000  I(0) 
Poland  -3.482  -2.884  -2.579  -5.161  0.000  I(0) 
Romania  -3.475  -2.881  -2.577  -4.495  0.000  I(0) 
             
INT_SP  1% C.V.  5% C.V.  10% C.V.  Statistic  Prob.  Process 
Croatia  -3.477  -2.882  -2.578  -3.476  0.010  I(0) 
Czech Republic  -3.474  -2.880  -2.577  -3.767  0.004  I(0) 
Hungary  -3.473  -2.880  -2.577  -2.745  0.069  I(0) 
Poland  -3.482  -2.884  -2.579  -4.352  0.001  I(0) 
Romania  -3.477  -2.882  -2.578  -3.963  0.002  I(0) 
Note: C.V. denotes critical value. 
 
5. Uncovered interest parity 
 
We start by rewriting eq. (5) using our empirical notation in which a bracket after 
the variable name is used to indicate a time shift (in month) of the variable: 
 
FX_CHG(3) = ʱ + β·INT_SP + ε(3)  (6) 
 
Eq.  (6)  is  estimated  for  each  country  individually  using  OLS.  The  results  are 
reported in Table 3. The choice of a 3-month investment horizon but monthly data 
leads to first- and second order-autocorrelation of the residuals. We therefore report 
Newey-West robust standard errors. The strict version of the UIP holds if ʱ = 0 and 
β = 1 and the residuals do not exhibit serial correlation of the third or a higher order. 
The table reports the F-statistics for the Wald test of the joint hypothesis ʱ = 0 and β 
= 1. Examination of the residuals reveals the existence of autocorrelation of first and 
sometimes second order, but never of higher orders. 
 
The estimation results reveal that the coefficients of determination, R
2, of all the 
regressions are extremely low. This is not surprising in light of Figures 2 and 3 and 
is found in all tests of the UIP hypothesis (Flood 1996). The foreign exchange return 
is much more volatile than the interest rate spread, which limits the ability of the 
interest rate spread to explain the foreign exchange change. 
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Table 3. UIP estimation results (OLS) 
   ˆ    ˆ   F-stat  R
2  Sample  Obs. 
Croatia  1.401 
(0.888) 
-0.486
** 
(0.210) 
31.660 
[0.000]  0.035  2000:02-
2011:09  140 
Czech Republic  -2.447 
(1.718) 
-1.380 
(0.972) 
9.492 
[0.000]  0.020  1999:01-
2011:09  153 
Hungary  9.546
* 
(5.706) 
-1.220
* 
(0.711) 
10.120 
[0.000]  0.028  1999:01-
2011:09  153 
Poland  3.658 
(6.479) 
-0.342 
(1.319) 
0.642 
[0.528]  0.001  2001:01-
2011:09  123 
Romania  2.023 
(3.290) 
0.308
*** 
(0.087) 
47.944 
[0.000]  0.148  1999:01-
2011:09  153 
Note: Newey-West standard errors are shown in round brackets. Superscripts 
***, **, * denote that 
the coefficient estimate is statistically different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% level of significance 
respectively. The null hypothesis of the F-test is that ʱ = 0 and β = 1; the p-value is shown in 
square brackets.  
 
The estimated slope coefficients in Table 3 are different from 1 at the 1% level of 
significance  for  all  five  sample  countries.  For  all  countries except  Romania,  the 
coefficients are also negative, which is in accordance with the  forward premium 
anomaly found in many other studies (cf. Section 3). For Romania, the estimated 
coefficient is positive and significantly different from zero (but also significantly 
different  from  one).  This  would  be  consistent  with  the  finding  that  the  UIP 
hypothesis is more likely to hold when the interest rates spread is large (Froot & 
Thaler 1990, Mehl & Cappiello 2007, Lothiana & Wu 2011). It follows from Figure 
3 that the spread between the Romanian 3-months interest rate and the 3-months 
Euribor rate was in the double digits until 2005 and also afterwards remained much 
higher than for the other sample countries. The large interest spread reflects that 
Romania has experienced a more prolonged convergence process the other sample 
countries. 
 
The  estimated  constant  terms  are,  with  the  exception  of  the  Czech  Republic, 
positive,  but  statistically  significantly  different  from  0  only  for  one  country.  As 
already noted, this coefficient should indicate the presence of either a risk premium 
or barriers to entry. While it is probable that barriers to entry or other parts of the 
regulatory  landscape  do  not  change  very  often,  previous  research  and  anecdotal 
evidence (again, from the recent financial crisis) indicates that the risk premium 
varies across time and economic cycles, and therefore to model them as a constant 
would be to impose a tight constraint on the model.
13 
 
                                                                  
13 The residuals generally exhibit some heteroskedasticity. To assess the impact, we estimated 
eq.  (6)  using  a  GARCH  specification. Although  the  GARCH  coefficients  are  statistically 
significant in many cases, the effects on the estimated ʱ and β and the explanatory power of the 
regressions are modest.   73 
The F-statistics reported in Table 3 shows that Poland is the only country for which 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. The Polish case is predicated by the fact that 
the standard errors of the two coefficient estimates are very high for this country. 
For all other countries in the sample, the joint hypothesis that ʱ and β take values in 
accordance with the UIP is rejected. 
 
6. Uncovered interest parity across time  
 
The test of the UIP in Section 5 is undertaken on the entire available time sample 
from the turn of the century to September 2011. The recent global financial crisis 
has,  however,  provoked  very  sharp  reactions  in  inter  alia  foreign  exchange  and 
interest markets. Eastern European countries largely escaped the first part of the 
crisis  (the  “sub-prime”  phase  from  summer  2007),  but  the  default  of  Lehman 
Brothers  in  September  2008  affected  the  region  greatly.  This  is  also  shown  by 
Figures 1 and 3, in which sudden depreciations of the currencies against the euro 
and a jump in the spreads between local interest rates and the Euribor are evident. 
 
In order to shed further light on the impact on the UIP of the global financial crisis, 
and  more  generally  to  shed  light  on  the  time  dimension,  we  undertake  rolling 
windows  estimations  with  samples  of  monthly  observations  for  five  years.  The 
estimations are based on eq. (6), i.e. the simple linear version of the UIP. Figure 4 
shows the coefficient of determination, while Figures 5 and 6 show the estimated 
constants and slope coefficients for the five countries. For all three figures, the date 
reported on the horizontal axis indicates the end of the sample.  
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Figure 4. Coefficient of determination, 5-year rolling windows.
 
 
Figure 4 reveals that the explanatory power of the regressions is always very low for 
Poland and Croatia, but relatively high before the crisis for the three other countries.   74 
This could be an indication that Poland and Croatia may have been more “closed” or 
insulated  from  external  influences  than  the  other  three  countries  in  the  sample 
(Jevcak  et al. 2011). Moreover, when the  windows consist largely of the period 
around  the  global  financial  crisis,  the  simple  UIP  specification  (without  crisis 
indicators and with fixed coefficients) basically has no explanatory power for the 
five sample countries.  
 
Further insights into developments before and after the global financial crisis hit the 
region can be gained from Figures 5 and 6. The coefficient estimate and +/– 2 times 
the Newey-West standard errors are depicted in each figure. The estimated constants 
and slopes for all the sample countries display extreme variation. This could be due 
to the relatively short span of the sample (five years for each rolling regression), or 
to an inherent instability in the relation between interest rate spreads and currency 
returns (Baillie & Bollerslev 2000). 
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Figure 5. Estimated constants, 5-year rolling windows. 
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Figure 6. Estimated slope coefficients, 5-year rolling windows. 
 
The  UIP  specifications exhibit  some  explanatory  power  for  the Czech  Republic, 
Hungary and Romania in the pre-crisis period. For the Czech Republic the constant 
was  close  to  zero  and  the  slope  was  negative.  The  absolute  value  of  the  slope 
estimate is extremely large when the period 2000-2001 is included in the sample; 
this was a period in which the Czech koruna appreciated rapidly. For Hungary the 
slope  estimate  is  also  negative  (below  -1),  while  the  constant  is  positive.  For 
Romania the slope is positive and the constant is negative. Moreover, the slope is 
close to one for all of the period before 2007 but turned negative later. This suggests 
that the UIP was satisfied in the transition period when the interest spread was very 
high, but not in later periods when the spread was reduced.  
 
The conclusion from the estimations in Sections 5 and 6 is that the UIP has limited 
empirical  validity  in  the  sample  of  CEE  countries.  Still,  there  are  noticeable 
differences across the sample countries and across different time samples. The rest 
of the paper examines a number of possible reasons for these findings. Transaction 
costs may limit arbitrage when the interest rate spread is small (Section 7) and the 
risk premium may be time-varying (Section 8).  
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7. Non-linearities  
 
The size of the interest rate spread may affect whether or not the UIP hypothesis is 
supported.  Transaction  and  information  costs  are  likely  to  keep  investors  from 
exploiting deviations from the UIP when the interest rate spread is small, but not 
when the spread is high (Froot & Thaler 1990). The conjecture has some empirical 
support (Mehl & Cappiella 2007, Lothiana & Wu 2011). 
 
The extreme volatility of the FX_CHG variable has made us pursue a simple and 
robust way to model the presence of different regimes for different levels of interest 
rate spreads. We separate the interest spread into two series. Taking the average 
spread  over  the  sample  for  each  country,  two  series  of  interest  rate  spreads  are 
computed: the variable INT_SP_LO equals the spread when the spread is lower than 
the average, and zero otherwise; the variable INT_SP_HI equals the spread when the 
spread is higher than the average, and zero otherwise. Both spread variables are 
included in the UIP specification: 
 
FX_CHG(3) = ʱ + β
LO·INT_SP_LO + β
HI·INT_SP_HI + ε(3)  (7) 
 
The results of the regressions are reported in Table 4. The results are as expected for 
Poland and Romania; the slope coefficients for high interest rate spreads are in both 
cases positive and statistically different from zero, while the coefficients for low 
spreads are statistically insignificant. The results are inconclusive for the other three 
countries; the slope coefficients of the high interest rate spreads are negative and the 
coefficients  are  generally  estimated  imprecisely.  Overall,  Table  4  provides some 
support  to  the  hypothesis that  the  UIP  should  hold  better  when  the  interest  rate 
spread is large than when it is low, at least for Poland and Romania.  
 
Table 4. UIP estimation results, high and low interest rate spread variables  
   ˆ   LO ˆ    HI ˆ    F-stat  R
2  Sample  Obs. 
Croatia  2.181 
(1.355) 
-0.969 
(0.729) 
-0.553
** 
(0.225) 
21.459 
[0.000]  0.041  2000:02-
2011:09  140 
Czech Republic  -1.905 
(1.680) 
0.107 
(3.328) 
-1.743
* 
(0.955) 
6.195 
[0.000]  0.023  1999:01-
2011:09  153 
Hungary  8.979 
(9.084) 
-1.073 
(1.894) 
-1.163 
(0.934) 
7.543 
[0.000]  0.028  1999:01-
2011:09  153 
Poland  1.445 
(5.111) 
0.221 
(0.497) 
0.464 
(0.221) 
4.936 
[0.002]  0.080  2001:01-
2011:09  129 
Romania  5.790 
(4.523) 
-0.113 
(0.462) 
0.266
*** 
(0.089) 
34.744 
[0.000]  0.156  1999:01-
2011:09  153 
Notes: OLS estimation. Newey-West standard errors are shown in round brackets. Superscripts 
***, **, * denote that the coefficient estimate is statistically different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level of significance respectively. The null hypothesis of the F-test is that ʱ = 0, β
L = 1and β
H = 
1; the p-value is shown in square brackets.  
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We have also implemented two other specifications of the non-linear relation from 
the interest spread to the foreign exchange rate change (results not shown). One 
approach was the smooth transition model of Granger & Teräsvirta (1993), but we 
generally had problems estimating the non-linear relation. Another approach was to 
use a Taylor order approximation up to the third order of the Granger & Teräsvirta 
model and then to estimate coefficients to all the included powers. In many cases the 
estimated  coefficients  attained  implausible  sign  and  size  and  the  R
2  of  the 
regressions did not change from the base case (results not shown). In conclusion, 
non-linearities  seem  to  play  only  a  minor  role  for  the  UIP  estimations,  i.e. 
transaction and information costs are unlikely to be behind the weak support of the 
UIP for the CEE countries. 
 
8. Risk aversion and financial instability 
 
A possible explanation for the low explanatory power of the UIP estimations is that 
the risk premium is in fact not constant. We include different proxies of the risk 
premium.  
 
We start by including the VIX index as a proxy of the risk premium. The VIX index 
is an implied volatility index calculated from option prices on the S&P500 equity 
index  and  is  often  seen  as  a  main  indicator  of  risk  aversion  in  global  financial 
markets.  A  higher  value  of  the  VIX  index  is  tantamount  to  larger  financial 
uncertainty. We include VIX as an additional explanatory factor in the empirical 
UIP specification:  
 
FX_CHG(3) = ʱ + β·INT_SP + γ·VIX + ε(3)  (8) 
 
The results are reported in Table 5. While the R
2 of the estimations do not improve 
markedly, the coefficient of VIX is positive for all the countries and also statistically 
significant for Croatia and Romania. More financial instability in global financial 
markets puts ceteris paribus depreciation pressure on the local currency. The slope 
coefficients  stay  largely  unchanged,  while  the  constants  change  sign  for  three 
countries,  becoming  (with  the  exception  of  Hungary)  negative,  but  mostly  not 
significant. This suggests that when global risk aversion is taken into account, the 
time-invariant remaining part captured by the constant loses its explanatory power.  
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Table 5. UIP estimation results, including VIX  
   ˆ    ˆ    ˆ   F-stat  R
2  Sample  Obs. 
Croatia  -2.125 
(1.912) 
-0.65
*** 
(0.230) 
0.185
** 
(0.094) 
25.946 
[0.000]  0.096  2000:02-
2011:09  140 
Czech Republic -13.048
** 
(6.133) 
-2.176
* 
(1.232) 
0.488 
(0.320) 
3.746 
[0.026]  0.131  1999:01-
2011:09  153 
Hungary  2.585 
(8.785) 
-1.439
* 
(0.757) 
0.373 
(0.430) 
5.580 
[0.005]  0.056  1999:01-
2011:09  153 
Poland  -11.250 
(9.412) 
-0.755 
(1.488) 
0.748 
(0.614) 
1.156 
[0.318]  0.075  2001:01-
2011:09  129 
Romania  -11.151
* 
(6.385) 
0.271
*** 
(0.082) 
0.639
** 
(0.294) 
40.687 
[0.000]  0.210  1999:01-
2011:09  153 
Notes: OLS estimation. Newey-West standard errors are shown in round brackets. Superscripts 
***, **, * denote that the coefficient estimate is statistically different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level of significance respectively. The null hypothesis of the F-test is that ʱ = 0 and β = 1; the 
p-value is shown in square brackets.  
 
An alternative measure of risk aversion, less global and more linked to European 
foreign exchange markets, may be based on other currency pairs in the region. As a 
rough measure of the external risk aversion affecting currency markets in Europe, 
we use the 3-month return of the Swedish krona against the euro. Sweden had a 
floating exchange rate throughout the sample period and the exchange rate is likely 
be affected by currency market pressures. The estimated equation is the following, 
where SWE_FX_CHG denotes the annualised 3-month depreciation of the Swedish 
krona against the euro: 
 
FX_CHG(3) = ʱ + β·INT_SP + δ·SWE_FX_CHG(3) + ε(3)  (9) 
 
The results are reported in Table 6. The R
2 are higher and the coefficients of the 
Swedish krona return are always statistically significant (with the exception of the 
results for Croatia) and have positive signs. It seems that including the currency 
pressure on the Swedish krona gives the same overall result as was given when the 
VIX variable were included, but in an arguably stronger way. Unlike in the equation 
with VIX, the constants become insignificant, with the exception of the one for the 
Czech Republic, where the constant is still significant and negative.  
   79 
Table  6.  UIP  estimation  results,  including  change  in  Swedish  krona  foreign 
exchange rate  
   ˆ    ˆ    ˆ   F-stat  R
2  Sample  Obs. 
Croatia  1.239 
(0.915) 
-0.462
* 
(0.221) 
0.094 
(0.071) 
30.880 
[0.000]  0.064  2000:02-
2011:09  140 
Czech Republic  -3.005
** 
(1.449) 
0.147 
(0.846) 
0.484
*** 
(0.173) 
5.042 
[0.008]  0.211  1999:01-
2011:09  153 
Hungary  6.714 
(5.655) 
-0.787 
(0.754) 
0.601
*** 
(0.211) 
6.992 
[0.001]  0.161  1999:01-
2011:09  153 
Poland  3.317 
(5.075) 
-0.304 
(1.168) 
1.199
*** 
(0.312) 
0.736 
[0.481]  0.310  2001:01-
2011:09  129 
Romania  1.679 
(2.758) 
0.324
*** 
(0.068) 
0.807
*** 
(0.129) 
77.248 
[0.000]  0.334  1999:01-
2011:09  153 
Notes: OLS estimation. Newey-West standard errors are shown in round brackets. Superscripts 
***, **, * denote that the coefficient estimate is statistically different from 0 at the 1, 5 and 10% 
level of significance respectively. The null hypothesis of the F-test is that ʱ = 0 and β = 1; the 
p-value is shown in square brackets.  
 
Concluding this section, the two indicators of risk aversion in international financial 
markets seem to exhibit substantial explanatory power. The estimated coefficients 
attain the expected sign and are statistically significant in many cases. The addition 
of these risk aversion measures, however, does not change the conclusions about the 
estimated slope coefficient, but has, as expected, an impact on the constant term, 
which becomes statistically insignificant.
14 
 
9. Summary  
 
This paper presented the results of empirical tests of uncovered interest parity in 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Romania during the first decade 
of the 21
st century. The objective was to examine whether the UIP would obtain 
empirical  support  in this  particular  sample,  and  to  ascertain  to which  extent  the 
convergence process and the global financial crisis have affected the UIP relation.  
 
We proceeded from simple estimations of the link between the return on 3-month 
exposure to local currencies against the euro and the spread between local interest 
rates  and  Euribor.  The  stability  of  the  estimated  parameters  was  analysed  using 
rolling windows. The analysis examined the importance of a number of issues that 
may  affect  the  results.  Estimations  took  into  account  the  possibility  of  different 
regimes depending on the size of the interest rate spread. Various indicators of risk 
and risk aversion were included, chiefly to capture the effect of the global financial 
crisis. The main results are summarised below.  
                                                                  
14 For the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland we tried to use the Exchange Market Pressure 
(EMP) index in Filipozzi & Harkmann (2010). The coefficients of the EMP index were not 
statistically significant (not reported).   80 
The basic model used to test the UIP in the CEE countries gave a result in line with 
most of the previous literature, namely that the UIP relation cannot be supported in 
general.  The  forward  premium  anomaly  is  confirmed  in  the  present  sample  of 
Central and Eastern European countries; the estimated slope coefficient is negative 
in all cases except Romania.  
 
Rolling  window  regressions  showed  that  the  coefficient  estimates  generally  are 
unstable and depend on the choice of sample. The rolling regressions also cast some 
light on the effect of global financial crisis on the UIP relations in the five CEE 
countries. At least for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Romania, there is a clear 
change  after  the  crisis  as  the  explanatory  power  of  the  UIP  regressions  drops 
dramatically after 2007. 
 
Transaction and information costs do not seem to affect the UIP estimations in ways 
which can be clearly discerned through the inclusion of non-linearities in the UIP 
relation. It is clear, however, that the importance of the interest rate spread varies 
between low and high interest rate spread regimes, but the picture is not uniform 
across  the  sample  countries.  For  Poland  and  Romania,  the  slope  coefficient  is 
positive  when  the  interest  rate  spread  is  large,  although  the  estimate  is  still 
statistically different from one. 
 
There is substantial evidence suggesting that the risk premium is not constant. Both 
the global volatility index VIX and the movements in the Swedish exchange rate 
seem to exhibit substantial explanatory power although not symmetrically across all 
five countries. This suggests that global risk factors have considerable impact on the 
liquidity of financial markets and the arbitrage processes underlying the UIP in the 
five countries from Central and Eastern Europe.  
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